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ABSTRACT 
The Second Amendment has gone from a rarely invoked constitutional 
provision to being one of the most hotly contested and politically charged 
protections of the Bill of Rights. Additionally, small government advocates 
have used local gun laws as a mechanism for challenging broad government 
regulation while conversely advocating for states’ rights, with Alaska recently 
joining a series of states seeking to expand local gun rights by passing state 
laws that nullify federal gun laws. Given Supreme Court case law and as 
demonstrated by recent Ninth Circuit precedent, the nullification course is 
almost certainly ill fated. Apart from the big government/small government 
proxy war being waged through local gun laws, others see the local, 
traditional character of the right to bear arms in a particular place as the most 
appropriate manner for scrutinizing regulation, given Supreme Court 
precedent and historic tradition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[The Second Amendment] had nothing to do with the concern of the remote 
settler to defend himself and his family against hostile Indian tribes and 
outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that?”1 
 
On May 27, 2010, Alaska House Bill No. 186, “An Act declaring that 
certain firearms and accessories are exempt from federal regulation,”2 
became law. Known otherwise as the Alaska Firearm Freedom Act 
(AFFA),3 this legislation sought to nullify the federal government’s 
ability to regulate personal firearms, firearm accessories, and 
ammunition that are manufactured entirely in Alaska and remain in 
Alaska.4 In so doing, the AFFA initiated Alaska’s attempted divorce 
from the federal gun control regime—a relationship that had begun with 
the United States government’s purchase of Alaska in 1867,5 and 
culminated in the Alaska Constitution’s verbatim adoption of the 
Second Amendment nearly 100 years later.6 
Alaska is not alone in its enactment of a federal gun control 
nullification statute.7 Indeed, it was the eighth of nine states to 
successfully make such a measure law,8 the first of which was Montana 
and the most recent being Kansas.9 More significantly, the Montana and 
 
 1.  Question from Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy during oral 
argument in District of Columbia v. Heller. Oral Argument at 8:13, Dist. of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-
290.pdf.  
 2.  Alaska Firearms Freedom Act (AFFA), 2010 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 23 
(codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2013)).  
 3.  ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2013).  
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Purchase of Alaska, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/alaska-purchase (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2016). 
 6.  GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 37 (5th ed. 2012).  
 7.  As of this writing, eight other states have enacted statutes exempting 
from federal regulation certain firearms manufactured in and remaining within 
state borders. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3114 (2010); Idaho 
Firearms Freedom Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3315A (2010); Second 
Amendment Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1204 (2013); Montana 
Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-104 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 37-35-2 (2010); Tennessee Firearms Freedom Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-
54-104 (2010); Utah State-made Firearms Protection Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-
5b (LexisNexis 2010); Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-
401 (2010). 
 8.  See AFFA, 2010 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 23 (passing in the Second Session 
of 2010). 
 9.  See supra note 8. Missouri has repeatedly fallen short enacting a 
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Kansas nullification statutes are the first and only laws to have their 
validity adjudicated in federal court.10 While the Kansas challenge was 
dismissed for lack of standing,11 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the dismissal of the Montana Shooting Sports Associations’ 
request for declaratory judgment on the validity of the Montana law in 
Montana Shooting Sports Association v. Holder,12 (hereinafter Montana v. 
Holder), finding that the action failed to state a claim because the 
Montana legislation was preempted by federal law and as such was 
invalid.13 
This Note will briefly examine the history of the right to bear arms 
as contemplated by the Second Amendment against the federal 
government, the right to bear arms as it has been enforced in Alaska, 
and the theory of nullification. 
It will also address the arguments that would likely be raised in 
defense of the AFFA, paying particular attention to those made and 
rejected by the District of Montana and Ninth Circuit in Montana v. 
Holder. Considering the Ninth Circuit decision, and its likely dispositive 
effect on claims raised in defense of the AFFA, it is all but a foregone 
conclusion that the AFFA is invalid. 
First, this Note will analyze the assertion that the federal gun laws 
regulating intrastate gun manufacturing, sale, and possession—which 
the AFFA seeks to nullify—are outside of Congress’ power to regulate 
interstate commerce because the activity in question is entirely local. 
Second, it will consider the argument that even if the intrastate 
commerce is deemed to fall within the purview of the Commerce 
Clause, such a reading is directly in conflict with state sovereignty and 
the states’ rights preserved under the Tenth Amendment. Both of these 
arguments were motivating rationales behind passage of the AFFA14 
and were also the plaintiffs’ central arguments in Montana v. Holder.15 
 
nullification bill. Jordan Shapiro, Missouri Lawmakers Fall Short on Gun 
Nullification, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 16, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ 
missouri-lawmakers-fall-short-gun-nullification.  
 10.  Carey Gillam, Gun Control Group Sues Kansas Governor Over Gun Rights 
Law, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 9, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-
07-09/news/sns-rt-us-usa-guns-kansas-lawsuit-20140709_1_kansas-bill-federal-
law-kansas-law.  
 11.  Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Brownback, 110 F. Supp. 
3d 1086, 1089 (D. Kan. 2015).  
 12.  727 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 955 (2014), and 
cert. denied sub nom. Montana v. Holder, 134 S. Ct. 1335 (2014). 
 13.  Id. at 981–83.  
 14.  See ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500(a) (2013) (rationalizing that the Tenth 
Amendment and Commerce Clause exclude intrastate commerce from the 
regulatory purview of the federal government).  
 15.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 727 F.3d at 979. 
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Given current Supreme Court jurisprudence and the decisions of the 
District of Montana and the Ninth Circuit in Montana v. Holder, this 
defense is also likely to fail in the case of the AFFA. 
Finally, in Part II, this Note will consider an argument, unrelated to 
the AFFA, which would embrace the view that the right to bear arms, as 
it relates to Alaskans, might warrant treatment distinct from the right to 
bear arms as it relates to citizens of other localities. After the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller16 and McDonald v. City 
of Chicago,17 Alaskans, like all Americans, have a constitutional right to 
purchase, keep, and bear firearms for self-defense.18 
An additional school of thought recognizes the potential for locally 
distinct protections under the right to bear arms.19 This belief, drawing 
in part on recent comparisons between First and Second Amendment 
doctrines,20 indicates the usefulness of analyzing the Second 
Amendment through the lens of First Amendment obscenity doctrine.21 
Such an analysis suggests that various firearms, on an as-applied basis, 
might demand different treatment by courts in various states, 
depending on a weapon’s usefulness for self-defense purposes locally 
and the character of state regulations. Differing treatment would serve a 
signaling function for courts to determine which firearms might be 
locally useful. This analysis, if applied, for example, to the National 
Firearms Act on behalf of or by an Alaskan plaintiff, would likely 
determine that at least portions of federal regulations violate Alaskans’ 
fundamental right to self-defense. Thus, while such a challenge would 
not save the AFFA from invalidity, it might better serve the needs of 
Alaskans concerned that the federal government is infringing their right 
to bear arms. 
 
 16.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 17.  561 U.S. 742 (2010).  
 18.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791.  
 19.  See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 142–43 (2013) (“A 
localized Second Amendment would define the term based on local standards, 
allowing increased scope for regulation in places—cities, most prominently—
where particular types of guns might be considered more uncommon, 
dangerous, or unusual.”) 
 20.  See generally David Kopel, First Amendment Guide to the Second 
Amendment, 81 TENN. L. REV. 417 (2014) (analyzing Second Amendment doctrine 
using First Amendment principles). 
 21.  See Jordan E. Pratt, Uncommon Firearms As Obscenity, 81 TENN. L. REV. 
633, 640 (2014) (analyzing uncommon firearms as obscenity); Blocher, supra note 
19. 
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BACKGROUND 
A.  The Federal Right to Bear Arms 
1.  By Enactment 
 
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”22 In the 
days immediately following the establishment of the federal 
government, Congress enacted legislation relating to the militia.23 
However, the realm of gun control was governed largely by the states 
until the Twentieth Century.24 The current federal gun control regime is 
almost entirely a creation of the past one hundred years.25 
The first true federal gun regulation was passed in 1934, as a result 
of growing concerns about “gangland crimes.”26 Collectively the 
National Firearms Acts of 1934 and 1938 (hereinafter NFA) taxed 
various weapons, including machine guns and sawed-off shotguns,27 
banned weapon sales to those “under indictment or . . . convicted of a 
crime of violence,”28 and created a licensing regime mandating that all 
firearms dealers selling weapons in interstate commerce be federally 
licensed and record all of their transactions.29 Importantly, Title II of the 
 
 22.  U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 23.  Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (repealed 1795); Militia 
Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, 271–74 (1792) (repealed 1903). 
 24.  See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early 
American Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 502–17 (2004) 
(describing numerous state laws, from the pre-Constitutional period through the 
Civil War, which were primarily responsible for regulating firearms). 
 25.  See History of Gun-Control Legislation, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/history-of-gun-control-legislation/ 
2012/12/22/80c8d624-4ad3-11e2-9a42-d1ce6d0ed278_story.html (describing the 
history of federal firearm regulations and identifying the National Firearms Act 
of 1934 as “the first federal gun-control law”).  
 26.  National Firearms Act, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND 
EXPLOSIVES (ATF), https://www.atf.gov/content/firearms/firearms-industry/ 
national-firearms-act (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).  
 27.  Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (2012). At the time, the tax was considered to be 
substantially prohibitive as to effectively ban the affected firearms. See id. 
(“While the NFA was enacted by Congress as an exercise of its authority to tax, 
the NFA had an underlying purpose unrelated to revenue collection. As the 
legislative history of the law discloses, its underlying purpose was to curtail, if 
not prohibit, transactions in NFA firearms.”).  
 28.  Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 785, 52 Stat. 1250, 1250–51 
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012)). 
 29.  Id. 
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Gun Control Act of 1968 revised the NFA.30 Currently, Title II firearms, 
including sawed-off shotguns, short-barreled rifles, silencers, machine 
guns, and those guns with an “any other weapon” designation, namely 
those “capable of being concealed on the person from which a shot can 
be discharged through the energy of an explosive, a pistol or revolver 
having a barrel with a smooth bore designed or redesigned to fire a 
fixed shotgun shell,”31 are effectively banned, absent a special permit 
from the federal government.32 This legislation was groundbreaking at 
the time and laid much of the framework for contemporary federal gun 
laws.33 The current criminal regime is enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 921,34 18 
U.S.C. § 922,35 18 U.S.C. § 923,36 18 U.S.C. § 924,37 and in Title 26 of the 
US Code, Chapter 53, Subchapters A-D,38 and was enacted largely by the 
Gun Control Act of 1968.39 While section 922 includes a robust catalogue 
of prohibited activities, several notable regulations include: the 
prohibition on manufacturing or selling firearms unless licensed by the 
federal government;40 a requirement that interstate transfers of firearms 
occur between federally licensed dealers;41 the by-and-large 
criminalization of possession of sawed-off shotguns42 and machine 
guns;43 and a ban on possession of a firearm by felons44 and those 
 
 30.  Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (current 
version at 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. (2012)). 
 31.  26 U.S.C. § 5845(e) (2012).  
 32.  26 U.S.C. § 5841 (2012). 
 33.  The Safe Streets Act of 1968, passed shortly after the assassinations of 
John F. Kennedy, Jr., Robert F. Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr., is in many 
ways an extension of the 1934 and 1938 Acts, especially its prohibition on 
possession by felons and its licensing regime. Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title IV,   
§ 922, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 228 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922). 
 34.  18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012) (codifying thirty-five definitions related to the 
subsequent provisions of Title 18).  
 35.  Id. § 922 (codifying unlawful acts related to firearms and their shipping 
or transportation in interstate commerce or foreign commerce, or firearm 
possession in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce).  
 36.  Id. § 923 (codifying the licensing regime in place for businesses 
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, and businesses importing or 
manufacturing ammunition).  
 37.  Id. § 924 (codifying the penalties for various firearm related crimes, 
including those in section 922, but with the addition of various aggravating 
factors). See, e.g., id. § 924(c)(1)(A) (showing the increased penalties for crimes of 
violence or drug trafficking committed by an individual who uses a firearm, 
carries a firearm, or possesses a firearm in furthering the offense). 
 38.  26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2012).  
 39.  Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (current 
version at 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. (2012)). 
 40.  18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (2012). 
 41.  Id. § 922(a)(2). 
 42.  Id. § 922(a)(4); § 922(b)(4). 
 43.  Id. § 922(o). 
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convicted of domestic violence.45 
2.  By Court Decision 
 
In 1939, the Supreme Court heard the first major challenge to 
Congress’ gun control regime in United States v. Miller.46 The Court held 
that the NFA’s effective ban on sawed-off shotguns did not violate the 
Second Amendment.47 More recently, the Court’s landmark decision in 
District of Columbia v. Heller48 overturned the District of Columbia’s ban 
on handgun possession and held that the Second Amendment protects 
an individual’s right to (1) possess a firearm unconnected to service in a 
militia, and (2) use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, 
particularly self-defense within the home.49 Furthermore, in language 
oft-cited by federal courts50 and described by scholars as “dicta of the 
strongest sort,”51 the Court stated that bans on possession by felons, 
bans on possession by the mentally ill, and limits on certain weapons—
like sawed-off shotguns and machine guns—are presumptively legal.52 
Importantly, Heller makes clear that its holding does not call into 
question the Miller decision: the right to keep and carry arms extends 
only to those weapons that are “‘in common use at the time’. . . . [T]hat 
limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting 
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”53 However, there is 
a tension inherent in the Court’s interpretation of Miller and the holding 
that the Amendment’s reference to “arms” enacts a specific protection of 
handguns. As the Heller Court acknowledges, Miller adopts a 
 
 44.  Id. § 922(g)(1). 
 45.  Id. § 922(g)(9). 
 46.  307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 47.  Id. at 178–79. 
 48.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 49.  Id. at 635. 
 50.  See, e.g., United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(“Dicta in Heller states that the opinion should not ‘be taken to cast doubt on 
long-standing prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons,’ and we have 
reaffirmed our prior jurisprudence on this point since Heller was decided.”) 
(internal citation omitted). Moreover, some appellate courts have gone so far as 
to treat that language as binding. See United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 
n.6 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Rozier argues that this language in Heller is merely dicta 
and we should not give it full weight of authority. First, to the extent that this 
portion of Heller limits the Court’s opinion to possession of firearms by law-
abiding and qualified individuals, it is not dicta. Second, to the extent that this 
statement is superfluous to the central holding of Heller, we shall still give it 
considerable weight.”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  
 51.  Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of 
Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009). 
 52.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.  
 53.  Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).  
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consequentialist rather than historical approach, making no mention of 
history whatsoever.54 Heller explicitly conducts a historical analysis 
insofar as it relates to the right to bear arms for self-defense purposes,55 
but its holding that the right to bear arms specifically protects hand gun 
possession is supported by a consequentialist analysis more evocative of 
Miller.56 Thus, it is unclear doctrinally whether future analyses are 
properly conducted entirely through a historical analysis, a 
consequentialist analysis, or some hybrid. Additionally, while Heller 
explicitly disavows interest balancing in determining the validity of gun 
regulations, it does not announce a particular method of review or tier of 
scrutiny by which courts should conduct Second Amendment analysis.57 
B.  The Right to Bear Arms in Alaska 
1.  By Enactment 
 
The Alaska Constitution became operative on January 13, 1959 with 
the state’s Formal Proclamation of Statehood.58 Alaska adopted the right 
to keep and bear arms verbatim from the Second Amendment,59 but 
amended its constitution in 1994 to include the following: “The 
individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by 
the State or a political subdivision of the State.”60 This amendment was 
passed before the Court’s decisions in Heller61 and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,62 and codified that the right in Alaska includes an individual 
citizen’s explicit right to keep and bear arms.63 
 
 54.  Id. at 625.  
 55.  See id. at 601–02 (describing the Court’s historical analysis of state 
constitutional provisions for the right to bear arms, and their references to self-
defense). 
 56.  See id. at 629 (“Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular 
weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete 
prohibition of their use is invalid.”).  
 57.  Id. at 634. 
 58.  The Constitution of the State of Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA: OFFICE OF THE 
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR BYRON MALLOTT, http://ltgov.alaska.gov/treadwell/ 
services/alaska-constitution.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).  
 59.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19. “A well-regulated militia being necessary to 
the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not 
be infringed.” Id.   
 60.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 61.  See supra BACKGROUND Sec. A(2). 
 62.  See infra BACKGROUND Sec. B(2).  
 63.  See HARRISON, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 6, 
at 29 (“The second sentence of this section was added by amendment in 1994. It 
makes explicit that the first sentence, which comes directly from Article II of the 
U.S. Bill of Rights, creates a personal right to possess a firearm unconnected with 
service in an official militia. U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 2008 and 2010 
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Alaska’s statutory provisions limiting the right to bear arms are in 
many respects similar to those codified in Title 18 and the NFA. 
Comparable provisions include Alaska’s ban on certain “prohibited 
weapons,”64 the definition of which includes sawed-off shotguns, 
machine guns, and silencers.65 That list of locally prohibited weapons, 
however, does not include smoothbore handguns capable of firing a 
shotgun shell, which are banned under the NFA’s “any other weapon” 
prohibition.66 Alaska’s regulatory scheme varies from the federal regime 
in several other key ways. Notably, while Alaska does ban convicted 
felons from possessing a firearm, that ban does not reach all felons: 10 
years after their conviction, felons can possess a firearm, so long as their 
original felony was not an offense committed against a person.67 
Additionally, Alaska has no law preventing gun possession by persons 
subject to a restraining order because of domestic violence,68 and does 
not prohibit possession by the mentally ill or illegal aliens.69 
Lastly, and importantly for the purpose of this Note, Alaska has 
enacted a nullification statute: the Alaska Firearms Freedom Act 
(AFFA). The AFFA was passed in 2010 and amended in 2013.70 It states 
that any firearm, ammunition or firearm accessory that does not enter 
into interstate commerce is “not subject to federal law or federal 
 
accomplished the same purpose as the 1994 amendment to Alaska’s constitution. 
Federal and state courts have ruled consistently that these constitutional 
guarantees do not prevent states from the reasonable regulation of firearms, 
such as requiring registration of handguns, prohibiting convicted felons from 
possessing firearms, and prohibiting concealed weapons.”); Eugene Volokh, 
State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 205 
(2006) (commenting on the Alaska amendment that “[a]n individual right is 
expressly secured, and the provision was enacted at a time (1994) when the 
supporters of an individual right treated the right as aimed at least in part at 
self-defense”).  
 64.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(3) (2013).  
 65.  Id. § 11.61.200(h)(1). 
 66.  Compare id. (omitting from the ban smoothbore pistols, among other 
firearms categorized under the National Firearms Act as “any other weapon”), 
with 26 U.S.C. § 5845(e) (2012) (describing those weapons categorized as “any 
other weapon”).   
 67.  ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.61.200(a)(1), 11.61.200(b)(1)(C). 
 68.  Prohibited Purchasers Generally in Alaska, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/prohibited-purchasers-generally-in- 
alaska/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).  
 69.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.61.190, 11.61.195, 11.61.200, 11.61.210, 11.61.220 
(failing to identify illegal aliens or the mentally ill as a class of individuals 
excluded from possessing a firearm); Mental Health Reporting in Alaska, LAW CTR. 
TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/mental-health-reporting-
in-alaska/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (“Alaska has no law requiring the reporting 
of mental health information to NICS.”).  
 70.  AFFA, ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2013).  
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regulation, including registration.”71 Additionally, it provides 
specifically that federal bans or restrictions on semiautomatic firearms 
or magazines, and any requirements that a firearm, magazine, or other 
firearm accessory be registered are “unenforceable.”72 
2.  By Court Decision 
 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court held that the 
Second Amendment is incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment.73 However, the impact of McDonald was perhaps felt less 
in Alaska than other states because Alaska’s state constitution already 
included a provision specifically providing individuals with the right to 
bear arms.74 
In some ways, the Alaska courts were ahead of the Supreme Court. 
Indeed, because the aforementioned 1994 amendment to the state 
constitution already explicitly applied the right to bear arms to 
individual Alaskans, state courts, for example, had already determined, 
even before Heller and McDonald, that the individual right does not 
entitle those individuals proscribed from gun ownership—like 
felons75—to be able to possess a weapon.76 
C.  The Theory of Nullification77 
Nullification is grounded in the belief that a state has the power to 
determine whether action by the federal government is unconstitutional 
and, if so, to invalidate the enforcement of unconstitutional action 
within the state.78 There have been various attempts at nullification 
throughout America’s history,79 but the foundational event was James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson’s respective Virginia80 and Kentucky81 
 
 71.  Id. § 44.99.500(a). 
 72.  Id. § 44.99.500(e). 
 73.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).  
 74.  See supra BACKGROUND Sec. B(1).  
 75.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200 (2013). 
 76.  See Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302–03 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that the felon-in-possession statute did not violate the State 
Constitution). 
 77.  This Note does not purport to undertake a thorough analysis of the 
history of nullification in the United States. For such an analysis, see James H. 
Read & Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and Undead: Nullification Past and Present, 1 AM. 
POL. THOUGHT 263, 273 (2012) [hereinafter Nullification Past and Present]. 
 78.  Id.; O. Shane Balloun, The Disarming Nature of the Wyoming Firearms 
Freedom Act: A Constitutional Analysis of Wyoming's Interposition Between Its 
Citizens and the Federal Government, 11 WYO. L. REV. 201, 206–07 (2011).  
 79.  Read & Allen, Nullification Past and Present, supra note 77, at 274.  
 80.  Nancy Verell, MONTICELLO, Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, 
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Resolutions, written in response to the passage of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, the latter of which announced it within a state’s right to declare a 
federal act to be “unauthoritative, void and of no force.”82 Even at the 
time, this notion was controversial: “The Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions garnered support from none of the other fourteen states. 
Four states made no response and ten states expressed outright 
disapproval. Some specifically maintained that the judiciary branch, not 
the state legislatures, was responsible for determining questions of 
constitutionality.”83 The Supreme Court would ultimately adopt the 
argument in favor of the judiciary as arbiter 150 years later in Cooper v. 
Aaron.84 
Building on the ideas of Jefferson, the modern concept of 
nullification was crafted by John C. Calhoun in the 1830s—and opposed 
by Madison himself and on behalf of the then-deceased Jefferson85—and 
has been used repeatedly as a mechanism to combat various federal 
enactments, including the Tariff of 1832, the desegregation of schools, 
and beyond.86 
However, while states have at times turned to nullification as a 
remedy for perceived unconstitutional infringements into their 
sovereignty, the Court made it clear in Cooper that it is not the states but 
rather the Court that is “supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution.”87 Cooper explicitly rejected the notion that the states could 
nullify school integration.88 Today, even in spite of Cooper, some 
 
https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/kentucky-and-
virginia-resolutions (last visited Mar. 18, 2016). 
 81.  The Kentucky Resolution of November 10, 1798, in THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON DIGITAL EDITION 550 (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson Looney 
eds., 2008). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Verell, supra note 80. 
 84.  358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 85.  “It is remarkable how closely the nullifiers who make the name of Mr. 
Jefferson the pedestal for their colossal heresy, shut their eyes and lips, 
whenever his authority is ever so clearly and emphatically against them.” James 
Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, December, 23 1832, Transcription: The Writings of 
James Madison (1900-1910), https://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mjm/23/23_ 
1158_1160.pdf. 
 86.  See Read & Allen, Nullification Past and Present, supra note 77, at 273–75 
(“A set of common claims are made by Calhoun; by James J. Kilpatrick (1920–
2010), editor of the Richmond News Leader during Southern states’ campaign of 
‘massive resistance’ to the Supreme Court’s school desegregation decisions and 
author of The Sovereign States (1957); and by Thomas E. Woods, author of 
Nullification (2010) and a contemporary advocate of nullification affiliated with 
the Tenth Amendment Center.”).  
 87.  Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
 88.  Id. (“No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against 
the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”).  
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continue to cling to the doctrine of nullification via the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments89 or by way of states’ “sovereign power” to determine 
when the federal government has overstepped its constitutional 
bounds.90 
D.  The Montana Firearms Freedom Act 
The Montana Firearms Freedom Act91 (MFFA) took effect in 
October of 2009.92 The operative section, Title 30, Chapter 20, § 104, 
exempts from federal jurisdiction any firearm, ammunition or firearm 
accessory that does not enter into interstate commerce.93 Specifically, the 
MFFA provides that any weapon that is manufactured and remains in 
Montana need not be registered or licensed and is not otherwise 
regulable by Congress.94 The Montana and Alaska statutes are virtually 
the same. The primary differences result from a 2013 amendment to the 
AFFA, which added an exemption for any weapon “possessed” in 
Alaska.95 Any differences aside, the bills are motivated by a common 
purpose: to challenge Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause 
to regulate intrastate activity.96 
 
 89.  See Sanford Levinson, The Twenty-First Century Rediscovery of 
Nullification and Secession in American Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness Incarnate or 
Serious Arguments to Be Wrestled With?, 67 ARK. L. REV. 17, 20 (2014) (discussing 
Texas Governor Rick Perry’s response to a United States District Judge who 
invalidated Texas's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages) [hereinafter 
Rediscovery of Nullification]; AFFA, 2010 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 23 (codified as 
amended at ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2013)) (“[T]he regulation of intrastate 
commerce is vested in the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States, particularly if not expressly preempted by 
federal law; the United States Congress has not expressly preempted state 
regulation of intrastate commerce pertaining to the manufacture on an intrastate 
basis of firearms, firearm accessories, and ammunition.”).  
 90.  Levinson, Rediscovery of Nullification, supra note 89, at 21 (describing 
legislation passed by the Idaho House of Representatives nullifying the 
Affordable Care Act).   
 91.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-101 (2013). 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. § 30-20-104. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  An Act Prohibiting State and Municipal Agencies From Using Assets to 
Implement or Aid in the Implementation of the Requirements of Certain Federal 
Statutes, 2013 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 52, Sec. 3. 
 96.  See Press Release, Will Vandergriff, House Passes Updated Alaska Firearm 
Freedom Act (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.housemajority.org/2013/04/11/house 
-passes-updated-alaska-firearm-freedom-act/ (invoking the intrusion of the 
federal government onto states’ sovereignty for passage of the AFFA); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 30-20-102 (2013) (“The regulation of intrastate commerce is vested 
in the states under the 9th and 10th amendments to the United States 
constitution [sic], particularly if not expressly preempted by federal law. 
Congress has not expressly preempted state regulation of intrastate commerce 
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ANALYSIS 
PART I: THE VALIDITY OF THE AFFA 
The Alaska Firearms Freedom Act (AFFA) is almost certainly 
invalid. This is all but a foregone conclusion since Gary Marbut97 filed 
suit—which was ultimately dismissed—in the District of Montana, on 
behalf of himself and his co-plaintiffs, Montana Shooting Sports 
Association and the Second Amendment Foundation98 (hereinafter 
Marbut), seeking a declaratory judgment on the validity of the MFFA. 
Specifically, Marbut argued that Montanans could legally produce, 
entirely in Montana, a .22 caliber Rifle, the Montana Buckaroo,99 and 
market that rifle, entirely in Montana, without complying with federal 
licensing law because of the MFFA’s protection.100 This challenge, its 
ultimate dismissal, and the Ninth Circuit’s upholding of the dismissal,101 
immediately implicated the AFFA; both laws consist of almost the same 
language102 and both Alaska and Montana are located inside the 
jurisdiction of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Thus, any judgment on 
the validity of the MFFA almost certainly binds the AFFA. 
In the MFFA’s case, the government moved to dismiss Marbut’s 
action, alleging that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because the government had not waived its sovereign immunity,103 and 
because the plaintiffs lacked standing,104 and that the plaintiffs failed to 
state a cognizable claim because of Supreme Court Commerce Clause,105 
 
pertaining to the manufacture on an intrastate basis of firearms, firearms 
accessories, and ammunition.”).   
 97.  Marbut is a community activist in Montana. See Jess Bravin, A Gun 
Activist Takes Aim at U.S. Regulatory Power, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230458440457644244049
0097046. 
 98.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 
2010 WL 3926029, at *1, (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010), report and recommendation 
adopted sub nom. Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-M-
DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 3926029 (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 2010). 
 99.  Id. at *10. 
 100.  Id. at *1.  
 101.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 102.  See supra BACKGROUND Sec. D. 
 103.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 
2010 WL 3926029, at *4–8, (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010). The district court ultimately 
found that this action fell within the exception to sovereign immunity when a 
plaintiff pursues “declaratory and/or injunctive relief suits against federal 
entities or officials seeking to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional 
statute.” Id. at *8.  
 104.  Id. at *9–14. 
 105.  Id. at *14–22. 
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Supremacy Clause, and Tenth Amendment precedents.106 All of these 
arguments raised in opposition to Marbut’s claim would likely be made 
against any individual attempting to uphold the AFFA. 
The issue of standing, while an initial obstacle for the MFFA 
challenge,107 ultimately was not dispositive in Montana v. Holder.108 
Likewise, a similar action seeking a declaratory judgment on the AFFA’s 
status would be contingent on establishing standing, but such a hurdle 
would not exist if an Alaskan used the AFFA to justify her violation of 
federal gun law while being prosecuted. 
Marbut’s two constitutional arguments in defense of the MFFA 
would also likely be raised in defense of the AFFA, and thus the District 
of Montana and the Ninth Circuit’s rulings on these questions are 
pivotal. Those two arguments are: (1) Congress’ power to regulate 
interstate commerce does not extend to the regulation of goods 
manufactured and sold in an entirely intrastate market, and (2) because 
the Constitution is silent as to the issue of intrastate commerce, the right 
to regulate such commerce is reserved for the states by the Tenth 
Amendment. 
A.  An Attempt to Re-Litigate Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
A challenge to the AFFA109 would likely argue, at least in part, that 
the regulation of intrastate gun activity, exempted from federal 
regulation by the AFFA, is not within Congress’ powers under the 
Commerce Clause. This argument is one of the central “findings” listed 
in the legislation that enacted the AFFA, and is, along with a Tenth 
Amendment argument, the logical underpinning not just of the AFFA 
but most Firearms Freedom acts.110 That argument hinges on whether 
intrastate gun manufacturing and sale fall into one of the three 
categories of commerce identified in United States v. Lopez as regulable 
 
 106.  Id. at *22–23.  
 107.  See id. at *9–14 (dismissing case for lack of standing).  
 108.  While the District of Montana found there was no standing, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed on the issue, finding that Marbut had alleged a sufficient 
economic injury under the assumption he would go through with his plan to 
manufacture the Montana Buckaroo without complying with applicable federal 
regulations. Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 980–81 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
 109.  ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2013). 
 110.  See The Firearms Freedom Act (FFA) is Sweeping the Nation, FIREARMS 
FREEDOM ACT, http://firearmsfreedomact.com/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014)  
(“The FFA is primarily a Tenth Amendment challenge to the powers of Congress 
under the ‘commerce clause,’ with firearms as the object – it is a state’s rights 
exercise.”).  
ARTICLE 5 - HILL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2016  2:46 PM 
2016 APPLYING FIREARM LOCALISM TO ALASKA 139 
 
pursuant to Congress’ Commerce Clause power.111 In considering 
essentially the same argument relating to the MFFA in Montana v. 
Holder, the trial court determined that “whether Congress has the power 
to regulate the intrastate activity contemplated by the Act is properly 
analyzed under the third and final . . . [Lopez] category. To fall within 
Congress’ Commerce Clause power on this basis, ‘the regulated activity 
must substantially affect interstate commerce.’”112 
Ultimately, both the District Court of Montana and Ninth Circuit 
agreed that the intrastate manufacturing and sale of the Montana 
Buckaroo would substantially affect interstate commerce.113 The lower 
court noted that to exempt even intrastate gun activities would 
effectively leave a “gaping hole”114 in the broader federal regulatory 
scheme controlling gun sales. Similarly, the appeals court was broadly 
unconvinced by Marbut’s Commerce Clause arguments.115 
Marbut, perhaps realizing the weakness of his case under current 
Supreme Court Commerce Clause doctrine, invited the District Court to 
“reverse the course of current Commerce Clause jurisprudence [and] . . . 
overrule the United States Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit.”116 Novel 
as it may be, both the trial court117 and the appellate court rejected out-
of-hand Marbut’s argument that “the Supreme Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence has improvidently altered the very form of 
American government, reading out dual sovereignty, and stripp[ed] 
from the States all independence of policy or action.”118 
In addition to trying to rewrite Commerce Clause case law, Marbut 
sought to distinguish the facts surrounding the MFFA from Supreme 
Court Commerce Clause precedent—in particular the Court’s decision 
in Gonzales v. Raich that the intrastate production of Medical Marijuana 
 
 111.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 112.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 2010 WL 3926029, at *15 (quoting Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 558–59).  
 113.  Id.; Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 727 F.3d at 982.  
 114.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 2010 WL 3926029, at *17 (quoting 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)).  
 115.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 727 F.3d at 982.  
 116.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 2010 WL 3926029, at *18.  
 117.  See id. (“[C]aselaw on point is the law, and binding authority must be 
followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so. This Court is 
thus bound by Raich, and must leave to the United States Supreme Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions. This Court is likewise bound to 
follow existing Ninth Circuit precedent, and could disregard Stewart only if the 
decision was clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority.”) 
(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).  
 118.  Brief for Appellants at *9, Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, No. 10-36094, 
2011 WL 2353956 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 727 F.3d 
at 981 (“Whether or not Marbut is correct in his critique of that jurisprudence, 
we are not free to disregard it.”). 
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was still regulable by the federal government under the Controlled 
Substances Act.119 Marbut argued that the distinction lies in the MFFA’s 
mandate that the guns regulated be specifically stamped, identifying 
them as entirely intrastate guns, while “the statute at issue in Raich did 
not similarly specify that it applied only to marijuana grown and used 
within the state of California, and did not provide a means for 
distinguishing locally cultivated marijuana from that cultivated 
elsewhere.”120 Again, the District Court was unconvinced that the 
“myopic” distinction was probative,121 considering that the fungibility of 
the marijuana in Raich was only a portion of the Court’s concern.122 The 
District Court saw a clear parallel between the impact that nine entirely 
intrastate marijuana markets would have on the national drug market 
and the similar effects that the MFFA and other Firearms Freedoms Acts 
would have on the national gun trade, regardless of the presence of a 
“Made In” stamp.123 
Additionally, the appellate court rejected Marbut’s reading of 
Raich, agreeing with the lower court that “regulation of the Montana 
Buckaroo is within Congress’ commerce power.”124 The Court of 
Appeals placed particular emphasis on its earlier holding in United 
States v. Stewart, and the analogue between the purportedly unique 
nature of the homemade machine guns concerned in Stewart and the 
“Made in Montana” stamped Buckaroo rifles at issue in Marbut’s 
claim.125 Neither firearm, according to the Court of Appeals, would 
necessarily remain outside the flow of interstate commerce, regardless of 
their distinct characteristics, and thus are regulable by Congress under 
Raich.126 
The failure of this argument is again damning for the AFFA. First, 
while the MFFA requires any weapons under its exception to federal 
law be stamped “Made in Montana,”127 there is no such requirement in 
the AFFA. Indeed, a 2013 amendment to the AFFA actually extends 
protections not only to guns manufactured in Alaska, but even any 
 
 119. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2–4 (2005). 
 120.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 2010 WL 3926029, at *18.  
 121.  Id. at *19.  
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id. at *20 (“Even more importantly, the Raich majority focused on the 
aggregate effect of medical marijuana use in the nine states with similar statutes 
and found that ‘Congress could have rationally concluded that the aggregate 
impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted from federal 
supervision is unquestionably substantial.’”). 
 124.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 
2013).  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id.  
 127.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-106 (2013). 
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weapon possessed exclusively in Alaska,128 a distinction that makes the 
AFFA far more permissive than the MFFA. Given this distinction 
between the AFFA and MFFA, it seems even more likely that a court 
would have little trouble determining that the intrastate activity reached 
by the AFFA would substantially affect interstate commerce. 
The same logic will apply to the intrastate activity exempted by the 
AFFA. Indeed, the AFFA actually exempts more local gun activity from 
federal regulation than does the MFFA by also protecting guns that are 
possessed entirely intrastate.129 Thus, gun activity occurring entirely 
within Alaska would substantially affect interstate commerce. The 
“discrete local activity”130—gun manufacturing and sales—substantially 
affects the production and distribution of materials traded in “an 
established, lucrative interstate market”131 for guns. Additionally, the 
Ninth Circuit in Montana v. Holder has already recognized the 
government’s permissible interest in the same comprehensive 
regulatory regime.132 
Even before Montana v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit’s previous 
determination that any cutout for intrastate gun commerce would 
undercut federal regulation of the interstate market in guns in United 
States v. Stewart 133 provided a clear harbinger for the decisions in 
Montana v. Holder and any case concerning the AFFA. Now, given 
Stewart’s already binding precedent that intrastate gun activity does fall 
under Congress’ Commerce Clause power and Montana v. Holder’s 
extension of that precedent to the facts surrounding federal firearm 
nullification, there seems to be little chance of the AFFA successfully 
raising such a claim, barring a reverse or change in course from the 
Raich/Lopez framework by the Supreme Court. 
It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court denied a petition for 
writ of certiorari in Montana v. Holder,134 and while the Commerce 
Clause argument would certainly fail if raised on behalf of the AFFA in 
 
 128.  An Act Prohibiting State and Municipal Agencies From Using Assets to 
Implement or Aid in the Implementation of the Requirements of Certain Federal 
Statutes, 2013 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 52, Sec. 3. 
 129.  Compare ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500(b) (2013) (exempting from federal law 
firearms possessed within the state) with MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-104 (2013) 
(exempting from federal law firearms manufactured within the state). 
 130.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147, 2010 WL 
3926029, at *16. 
 131.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005).  
 132.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 981–82 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 133.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 2010 WL 3926029, at *17 (quoting Raich, 
545 U.S. at 22). 
 134.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 955 
(2014). 
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district court or at the Ninth Circuit, should a challenge to the AFFA 
reach the Supreme Court, there could theoretically be a minimal hope135 
that the Court, when faced with the questions posed by a gun 
nullification statute, could reverse nearly a century of Commerce Clause 
precedent. For example, the Court has, when considering gun 
regulations, taken notice of federalism concerns when paring down or 
invalidating another different federal gun control law.136 
Additionally, in recent years the Court has signaled some hesitance 
towards an overly robust Commerce Clause power.137 However, even in 
such cases, like the Court’s recent decision in N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius,138 the 
Court still reaffirmed Congress’ power to regulate intrastate commerce 
that affects an interstate market.139 While Justice Roberts found that the 
Congressional action in question—the individual mandate of the 
Affordable Care Act—was outside Congress’ Commerce Clause power, 
the Court did so while still endorsing Wickard v. Filburn,140 Raich, and 
broad notions that Congress has the power to “anticipate the effects on 
commerce of an economic activity.”141 Because gun possession is 
essentially per se economic—even if a gun is manufactured at home, it 
would necessarily consist of parts purchased—it seems clear that 
Sebelius’s reaffirmation of Wickard and Raich is of great consequence to 
the AFFA—and its likely invalidity—if and when it is challenged in the 
 
 135.  For an insight into the likelihood of this, consider an exchange from the 
film Dumb and Dumber, in which the main character, Lloyd Christmas, asks a 
woman of interest what their chances are of ending up together. When she 
responds that the odds are “one out of a million,” his answer is, “so you’re 
telling me there’s a chance!” DUMB AND DUMBER (New Line Cinema 1994).  
 136.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (“Were the Federal 
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state 
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, 
the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur 
and political responsibility would become illusory.”); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (“It is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty 
that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of 
authority. It is [not] compatible with this independence and autonomy that their 
officers be ‘dragooned’ . . . into administering federal law . . . .”).  
 137.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (holding that a federal law banning possession 
of a firearm in a school zone is an invalid exercise of Congress’ powers under the 
Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (holding 
that the federal provisions providing a civil remedy for the victims of gender-
motivated violence was an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional 
Commerce Clause power); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct 2566, 
2585 (2012) (holding, for a plurality, that the individual mandate of the 
Affordable Care Act violates the Commerce Clause by regulating prospective 
commercial activity as opposed to actual commercial activity). 
 138.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct at 2585. 
 139.  Id. at 2585–86.  
 140.  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 141.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct at 2590 (emphasis added).   
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Ninth Circuit and before the Supreme Court. 
B.  Pitting The Supremacy Clause Against The Tenth Amendment 
Marbut’s second argument for the validity of the MFFA received 
similar disapproval from the district and appellate courts and is likely 
unfavorable for the AFFA. Marbut argued that because the Tenth 
Amendment provides “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people,”142 Congress has overstepped its 
authority by regulating intrastate gun sales. Given the AFFA’s explicit 
invocation of the Tenth Amendment in its “findings” section,143 it seems 
likely that a similar argument would be made in defense of the AFFA if 
challenged. However, in Montana v. Holder the trial court quickly and 
summarily dismissed this as a misinterpretation of the amendment and 
ignorant of the Supremacy Clause.144 
Although the Court of Appeals did not address these issues 
specifically, it still upheld the ruling of the District Court.145 Given the 
lower court’s Montana v. Holder holding and its affirmation by the Ninth 
Circuit,146 it is unlikely that the AFFA will succeed if challenged in 
federal court on Tenth Amendment grounds.147 The AFFA will face the 
same scrutiny from any court that, because it directly conflicts with a 
federal law deemed “within the powers granted to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause, it cannot constitute an exercise of power reserved to 
the states.”148  
Absent a challenge to the Supreme Court, re-litigating these issues 
 
 142.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147, 2010 WL 
3926029, at *23 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X). 
 143.  AFFA, 2010 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 23 (codified as amended at ALASKA 
STAT. § 44.99.500 (2013)). 
 144.  See Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 2010 WL 3926029, at *23 (“Because 
federal firearms laws are a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause as applied to the intrastate activities contemplated by the Act, 
there is no Tenth Amendment violation in this case.”); id. at 22 (citing the 
Supremacy Clause for the notion that “federal laws prevail to the extent the 
[MFFA] conflicts with them”).  
 145.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 
2013).  
 146.  See supra ANALYSIS Sec. A.  
 147.  See Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 727 F.3d at 981–83 (holding that its 
earlier precedent from United States v. Stewart and Supreme Court precedent 
from Raich are binding on the Commerce Clause issue); Hart v. Massianari, 266 
F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[C]aselaw on point is the law . . . . Binding 
authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to 
do so.”) (emphasis in original).  
 148.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n, 2010 WL 3926029, at *23.  
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would likely prove fruitless considering the earlier decision’s now-
binding nature in the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, even before the Ninth 
Circuit ruled on the issue, Marbut himself acknowledged that litigating 
these issues at the district court level and before the court of appeals 
would likely end in defeat.149 However, since the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari to the Ninth Circuit,150 it seems likely that, even if in 
challenging the AFFA, Alaska re-litigated the aforementioned issues, the 
Court would similarly refuse to consider those arguments in the context 
of the AFFA. If the Court did grant certiorari, it would almost certainly 
follow its previous Supremacy Clause precedent on the issue of 
nullification.151 
The Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Montana v. Holder and United States 
v. Stewart make the AFFA virtually dead on arrival in any court within 
the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, despite recent Supreme Court precedent in 
United States v. Lopez,152 United States v. Morrison,153 and N.F.I.B. v. 
Sebelius,154 signaling limits on Congress’ Commerce Clause power, none 
of these cases have overturned or even called into question the well-
established principle that intrastate commerce is regulable by the federal 
government.155 Similarly, Supremacy Clause precedent clearly indicates 
that the Tenth Amendment arguments raised in defense of the MFFA, if 
raised on behalf of the AFFA, would likely fail in any court. 
 
 149.  See Ninth Circuit Rules in Firearms Freedom Act Case, FIREARMS FREEDOM 
ACT (Aug. 23, 2013), http://firearmsfreedomact.com/2013/08/23/ninth-circuit-
rules-in-firearms-freedom-act-case-82313/ (“We must get to the U.S. Supreme 
Court to accomplish our goal of overturning 70 years of flawed Supreme Court 
rulings on the interstate commerce clause. We knew that the Ninth Circuit 
couldn’t help us with that. Only the Supreme Court can overturn Supreme 
Court precedent. However, now that the standing question is resolved in our 
favor, we have the green light to appeal to the Supreme Court.”).  
 150.  Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 955 
(2014). 
 151.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that prior 
precedent required the Governor of Alaska and the state’s legislature to enforce 
a judicially-approved integration plan).  
 152.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (holding that a 
federal law banning possession of a firearm in a school zone is an invalid 
exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause). 
 153.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (holding that 
the federal provisions providing a civil remedy for the victims of gender-
motivated violence was an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional 
Commerce Clause power). 
 154.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct 2566, 2585 (2012).  
 155.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 
127–28 (1942).  
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PART II: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF ALASKANS’ SECOND 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
After Heller and McDonald, it is unambiguous that individuals have 
the right to keep and bear arms, particularly handguns, for the purpose 
of self-defense.156 However, the Court has not clarified, more 
specifically, how exactly to go about scrutinizing regulations that limit 
the right. Indeed, lower courts have struggled with the question and 
there has not been uniformity in adopting doctrinal approaches to 
measuring whether regulations infringe upon the Second 
Amendment.157 
Thus far, this Note has focused its analysis on a piece of legislation 
aimed at nullifying federal gun control laws. But as stated above, the 
law in question is almost certainly unenforceable and as such serves 
little to no function in a practical sense. However, Alaskans serious 
about potentially challenging federal limitations on gun rights could 
make the argument, embraced by several scholars, that the Second 
Amendment—even as interpreted by the Court in Heller and 
McDonald—necessarily encompasses different rights for different 
citizens, dependent on the local character of self-defense needs and 
historical local regulations, and therefore requires additional protections 
for Alaskans who have unique self-defense needs.158 As a normative 
matter, the keystone of this argument is that the right to bear arms, 
codified in the Second Amendment and interpreted through a historical 
lens in the Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald,159 has a 
 
 156.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) 
(“[I]n Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a 
handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense . . . . We therefore hold that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second 
Amendment right recognized in Heller.”).   
 157.  Compare Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (employing a 
two prong approach based on “whether a particular provision impinges upon a 
right protected by the Second Amendment [and] if it does, . . . whether the 
provision passes muster under the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny”) 
with United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (“The 
individual right to bear arms might well be a fundamental right, the restriction 
of which requires strict scrutiny.”). See generally Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, The 
Standardless Second Amendment, Issue Brief, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. AND POL’Y 
(Oct. 2010), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Mehr_and_Winkler_ 
Standardless_Second_Amendment.pdf.   
 158.  Blocher, supra note 19, at 87-88.  
 159.  See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (basing its analysis on the 
Second Amendment’s “text and history”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 
742, 767 (2010) (internal citations omitted) (basing its incorporation analysis on 
whether the right to bear arms is “deeply rooted in the nation’s history and 
tradition”).  
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longstanding tradition of being regulated in varying ways in varying 
locales throughout American history and beginning even earlier: “This 
geographic variation, and specifically the urban/rural divide, predates 
the Second Amendment itself.”160 
In making this Second Amendment argument, because it is 
untested in courts, it may be helpful to analogize to First Amendment 
obscenity doctrine and its emphasis on “community standards,” which 
provides a useful doctrinal analogue for how a court ought to analyze 
the notion that Alaskans’ right to bear arms as distinct from those of 
New Yorkers, Chicagoans, and even the residents of the lower 48 states 
at large.161 Indeed, Heller itself recognizes the presence of such a nexus 
between limitations on First Amendment free speech and potential 
limitations on the Second Amendment.162 While such a position could 
lead to an expansion of gun rights in some areas or some respects, it 
could potentially uphold stricter limitations on gun rights in others. 
So-called “Firearm Localism”163 offers the argument that courts 
“can and should incorporate the longstanding and sensible differences 
regarding guns and gun control in rural and urban areas, giving more 
protection to gun rights in rural areas and more leeway to gun 
regulation in cities.”164 The doctrinal theory behind firearm localism 
invokes an important tradition-based framework based upon America’s 
history of differing treatment of firearms in urban and rural localities,165 
as well as providing a pragmatic mechanism to recognize the real and 
conscious divide between the nature of gun ownership in rural and 
urban communities.166 An appeal to history is particularly crucial given 
Heller and McDonald’s doctrinal emphasis on a historical analysis in their 
 
 160.   Id. at 112–13.  
 161.  See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 21 (describing obscenity doctrine as useful for 
analysis of uncommon firearms); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns As Smut: Defending 
the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1291 (2009) (“While 
Justice Scalia did not specifically disclaim any scrutiny analysis, he strongly 
indicated that the Second Amendment, like the First, is an Amendment 
implemented in the first instance by categories.”); Blocher, supra note 19, at 125–
26. Cf. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment 
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 54 (2012) (“[C]ritical normative, 
descriptive, and practical differences between the two Amendments and the 
rights they protect undermine those analogies.”). 
 162.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“The First Amendment contains the freedom-
of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for 
obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets . . . . The Second Amendment is no 
different.”).  
 163.  Blocher, supra note 19, at 85. 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Id. at 112–13.  
 166.  Id. at 121–24. 
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construction of the right to bear arms and the right to self-defense.167 
Firearm localism could be applied easily enough via the aforementioned 
comparison of the Second Amendment to the First Amendment with 
respect to the potentially local character of the rights in question.168 
The parallels between obscenity and the Second Amendment are 
multiple. While the First Amendment broadly protects speech, that 
which is deemed obscene is not entitled to those protections.169 
Correspondingly, while the Second Amendment protects the right to 
bear arms for purposes of self-defense, it does not protect the use of 
dangerous and unusual firearms.170 Furthermore, the normative 
concerns surrounding obscenity, and in particular sexually explicit 
material, are not unlike those surrounding uncommon weapons: a 
constant concern in obscenity doctrine, for example, is protection of 
children,171 not inapposite to the Second Amendment’s imperative on 
protecting the use of defense for protecting one’s family.172 While both 
amendments protect a core set of fundamental rights, the First 
Amendment does not reach material that is “utterly without redeeming 
social importance,”173 and the Second Amendment does not protect 
socially useless weapons that serve only dangerous purposes rather than 
lawful ones.174 
In addition to the standalone concept of firearm localism, there is a 
particularly compelling case, it has been argued, for treating uncommon 
firearms under the Second Amendment similarly to how obscenity is 
scrutinized under the First Amendment.175 The definition of uncommon 
 
 167.  See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (basing its analysis on the 
Second Amendment’s “text and history”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 
742, 767 (2010) (internal citations omitted) (basing its incorporation analysis on 
whether the right to bear arms is “deeply rooted in the nation’s history and 
tradition”).  
 168.  Blocher, supra note 19, at 125–26; Pratt, supra note 21, at 644–47.   
 169.  See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold that 
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”).  
 170.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
 171.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (“This Court has 
recognized that the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination 
or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it 
a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of 
exposure to juveniles.”); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968) 
(“[W]e have indicated . . . that because of its strong and abiding interest in 
youth, a State may regulate the dissemination to juveniles of, and their access to, 
material objectionable as to them, but which a State clearly could not regulate as 
to adults.’’).  
 172.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (problematizing the D.C. gun ban for its 
intrusion on an individual’s ability to defend her “self, family and property”).   
 173.  Roth, 413 U.S. at 485.  
 174.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
 175.  Pratt, supra note 21, at 656. 
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firearms—which are currently regulated under federal law by the 
National Firearms Act (“NFA”)—could be of particular interest to 
Alaskans given the unique circumstances many Alaskans face on a day 
to day basis when compared with the rest of the country. Just as a 
phrase uttered in one part of the country might have a very different 
meaning somewhere else, a weapon that—if legal—might be commonly 
and safely used in rural Alaska might be just as uncommon and 
dangerous in urban Baltimore. 
Given this parallel between commonality and necessity of use and 
community standards, particularly the questions of social utility that are 
implicit in the Court’s construction of both the First and Second 
Amendments, the clearly defined test for identifying obscenity is a 
logical starting point for developing a test to determine which weapons 
are dangerous and unusual. Obscenity doctrine weighs multiple factors 
to determine whether speech is obscene, with community standards 
playing a major role in making that determination.176 In applying a 
three-pronged test to determine whether speech is obscene, the 
quintessential and first question is “whether ‘the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.”177 The second 
prong asks whether the work “depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable 
state law,”178 and the third, finally, “whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”179 
Reconfiguring these tests to conform to a Second Amendment 
inquiry would require only replacing consideration of the ‘work’ in 
question with the weapon in question, slightly modifying the social 
interests being considered, and changing deliberation on the interests at 
stake to a self-defense interest—which the Court has acknowledged as 
the central protection of the Second Amendment.180 The resulting test 
would state that an otherwise prohibited “uncommon” gun is permitted 
if: (1) applying contemporary community standards, the firearm is 
necessary to protect an otherwise unsatisfied self-defense interest of 
 
 176.  See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32–33 (discussing the constitutionality of applying 
differing community standards to speech, concluding “[i]t is neither realistic nor 
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people 
of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las 
Vegas, or New York City”). 
 177.  Id. at 26 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485).  
 178.  Id.  
 179.  Id.  
 180.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (“In Heller, we 
held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the 
home for the purpose of self-defense.”). 
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individuals in a certain locality; (2) the firearm does not function in such 
a way that is offensive to specific state law; and (3) the firearm has not 
served a historically antisocial function nor will it serve a presumptively 
antisocial future function. 
The purpose of the first prong then, to consider the self-defense 
utility of a particular weapon through a localized community standards 
lens, is directly parallel to the obscenity doctrine’s first prong181 and a 
reflection of the self-defense concerns which are the constant 
undercurrent throughout Heller.182 The second prong also serves 
important doctrinal functions: it allows courts, in determining the 
applicable community standards, to take a cue from the legislature as to 
what sort of weapons might per se fall outside of community norms. 
This analysis is more grounded in formalism than functionalism and 
takes into account Heller’s emphasis on a historical analysis cognizant of 
longstanding traditions.183 Consider, for example, Alaska’s ban on 
 
 181.  See id. at 21 (discussing the social concerns relating to obscenity).  
 182.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been 
central to the Second Amendment right.”).  In a concurrence to a per curiam 
decision striking the logic employed by the Massachusetts State Supreme Court 
to scrutinize Massachusetts’ ban on stun guns, Justice Alito, joined by Justice 
Thomas, casts doubt on the notion that the ability to replace one weapon with a 
different equally effective weapon, for the purposes of self-defense, might 
render the former weapon unprotected under the Second Amendment: “The 
[lower court] suggested that Caetano could have simply gotten a firearm to 
defend herself [instead of a stun gun]. But the right to bear other weapons is no 
answer to a ban on the possession of protected arms.” Caetano v. Mass., 577 U. 
S. ____, at *9 (2016) (per curiam) (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). It is unclear whether Justice Alito’s rationale would be 
applicable beyond the comparison of a lethal weapon to a non-lethal weapon. 
Seemingly, the major distinction for Justice Alito is that an individual should 
have the option to use a non-lethal weapon rather than be forced to use a more 
deadly—but equally effective for the purposes of self-defense—handgun: 
“Courts should not be in the business of demanding that citizens use more force 
for self-defense than they are comfortable wielding.” Id. at *9–10. Moreover, it is 
unclear whether Justice Alito’s position would even garner a majority of votes. 
Here, the per curiam opinion was much more limited in its rejection of the lower 
court’s Second Amendment holding than was Justice Alito. Rather than reaching 
the merits of the Second Amendment question, the Court simply rejected the 
logic employed by the lower court as a misreading of Heller by stating that (1) 
“the Second Amendment “extends to arms that were not in existence at the time 
of the founding,”(2) by equating unusual with in common use at the time of the 
Second Amendment’s enactment, the [lower] court’s second explanation is the 
same as the first; it is inconsistent with Heller for the same reason,” and (3) 
“Heller rejected the proposition that only those weapons useful in warfare are 
protected” by the Second Amendment. Id. at *1–2 (per curiam).  
 183.  See id. at 626–27 (discussing the presumptive legality of laws regulating 
gun possession by the mentally ill and regulating possession of guns deemed 
“not in common use”). 
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machine guns.184 This state law would indicate that automatic weapons 
are traditionally outside the community standard and thus not 
protected. The third prong, finally, builds in Heller and McDonald’s 
concern for history and tradition185 and would act as a fail-safe for the 
second prong, ensuring that states could not simply repeal bans on 
weapons that have a long history of illicit or undesirable use—for 
example, sawed-off shotguns—simply to create a loophole from federal 
law. The last portion, about presumptively illicit future functions, would 
require the government to make a rebuttable showing that the 
uncommon firearm in question serves no purpose other than an 
antisocial one.186 
The three-pronged approach blends the doctrines from Heller, 
giving equal import to both the character and tradition of a weapon and 
accounting for Heller’s emphasis that there are consequentialist concerns 
in determining whether a weapon receives Second Amendment 
protection, as well as taking into account the importance of historical 
considerations in determining whether the right protects unusual 
weapons. Additionally, this framework might help to rectify a logical 
difficulty inherent in Heller’s pronouncement that “the sorts of weapons 
protected [a]re those ‘in common use at the time.’”187 Given Heller’s lack 
of clarification of the definition of common use188—how long must a gun 
be in use to be deemed common, and by how many people—there is 
some uncertainty over how to apply this language189 and there is the 
inherent catch-22 that guns that are banned can never be commonly 
used.190 By adopting the community standards test, the question would 
 
 184.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(3) (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(h)(1)(c) 
(2010).  
 185.  See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (discussing the practicality of using a 
handgun versus a long gun for self-defense).  
 186.  This is a direct analog to the Court’s logic in Miller, which is also 
forward looking in its consequentialist approach: “[I]t is not within judicial 
notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its 
use could contribute to the common defense.” United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
174, 178 (1939) (emphasis added).  
 187.  Id. (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).  
 188.  The Court has recently indicated that the Second Amendment’s 
protection of uncommon firearms, at its bottom, must at least extend beyond 
those weapons available at the time of the Amendment's drafting. See Caetano v. 
Mass., 577 U.S. ___, at *2 (2016) (per curiam) (“[E]quating ‘unusual’ with ‘in 
common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment’ . . . is 
inconsistent with Heller . . . .”).   
 189.  See Andrew R. Gould, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1563 (2009) (discussing the 
vagaries of Heller’s “common use” language). 
 190.  The third prong of the proposed test—whether an otherwise uncommon 
weapon has served a historically antisocial purpose—is aimed at remedying this 
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no longer be common use, but whether a weapon satisfies the 
aforementioned three-prong approach. 
Applying this framework to Second Amendment commonality and 
purpose would allow the judge, on an as-applied basis, to determine 
whether a particular weapon is contrary to the community’s self-defense 
interest or whether a certain weapon is outside the class of weapons 
historically possessed by the locality for self-defense purposes. 
The adoption of a community standards test for uncommon 
firearms would likely lead to challenges of various local and federal 
firearms bans. Consider, for example, a challenge brought by an 
Alaskan, to the NFA’s ban on “any other weapon,” particularly “a pistol 
or revolver having a barrel with a smooth bore designed or redesigned 
to fire a fixed shotgun shell.”191 There is no Alaska law banning 
possession of handguns with a smooth bore barrel designed to fire a 
fixed shotgun shell.192 Such a weapon, in the context of the Alaskan 
wilderness, would perhaps be a uniquely effective weapon for self-
defense, serving a purpose that others cannot. While high-caliber rifles 
and shotguns can stop a bear,193 both are cumbersome and could be 
difficult to accessibly carry while doing everyday chores outside the 
house that require using both hands. So although they might provide 
the necessary stopping power for a hunter, a smaller weapon would be 
much more conducive to self-defense for an Alaskan resident who 
simply wishes to do chores outside on her property and happens to live 
in an area populated by bears. Some handguns, like magnum revolvers, 
can “get the job done in a pinch,”194 but they are difficult to aim 
accurately and are inferior to shotguns in stopping power and spread, 
essentially requiring that the shooter hit a vital organ to put down a 
 
circularity problem. By phrasing this portion of the test in the negative, focusing 
on an antisocial purpose rather than a socially positive purpose, new weapons 
not yet in common use could satisfy the third prong absent a strong showing of 
future dangerousness. However, because an uncommon weapon would have to 
satisfy all three prongs to be stricken, this does not mean any cognizable future 
weapon would be unregulable. The future provision of all three prongs 
collectively would still allow regulating future firearms broadly, so long as some 
other weapon would serve the self-defense function of the firearm in question, 
or the weapon fails scrutiny under some other non-NFA, designation.  
 191.  26 U.S.C. § 5845(e) (2012).  
 192.  See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(h) (2010) (omitting this weapon from the 
prohibited weapons list).  
 193.  See Bears and You, ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES., DIV. OF PARKS & OUTDOOR 
RECREATION, http://dnr.alaska.gov/parks/safety/bears.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 
2015) (suggesting using at least a .300 mag rifle or 12-gauge shotgun to stop a 
bear); Chuck Hawks, Firearms for Defense Against Bears, 
http://www.chuckhawks.com/firearms_defense_bears.htm/ (last visited Jan. 
11, 2015). 
 194.  Hawks, supra note 193. 
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bear.195 A smooth bored pistol firing shotgun shells could be worn in a 
holster, making it easy to carry around one’s property without 
occupying her hands, and because it could fire shotgun shells, it would 
provide the necessary force to stop a charging animal,196 be it a bear,197 
moose,198 or wolf.199 Moreover, because shotgun shells fire a spray 
pattern,200 it would not have the same aiming issue associated with high-
caliber handguns.201 
Applying the above-developed three-pronged community 
standards test to this smooth bore, shotgun-shell firing handgun would 
likely result in finding that the NFA ban was, at least in Alaska, 
violating Alaskan’s Second Amendment right to self-defense because: 
(1) this weapon is better suited to serve the self-defense needs of the 
community in question than any other legal weapon; (2) this weapon is 
not prohibited by Alaska state law; and (3) no such weapon has been in 
common use, and therefore is not attached to a historical stigma. 
Admittedly, the potential to analogize this weapon to a sawed-off 
shotgun, which is attached to historical stigma,202 does exist. However, 
the very fact that the NFA itself distinguishes between the two would 
enable a challenge to the NFA to make the argument that the two ought 
to be analyzed as distinct since the law treats them as distinct. 
The above hypothetical at first seems to pose a serious issue with 
the suggested doctrinal framework; it would allow a similar challenge to 
the NFA ban on sawed-off shotguns—as all of the characteristics listed 
in favor of the smooth bore pistol are virtually mirrored by sawed-off 
shotguns. If that were the case, the rule would conflict with Heller’s clear 
indication that the NFA ban on sawed-off shotguns is proper.203 
However, it is important to note that a challenge to sawed-off shotguns 
in Alaska under the community standards framework would not 
 
 195.  See id. (“If you are not an experienced handgunner and/or are not 
willing to practice regularly with your bear gun, I suggest that you forego 
choosing a handgun.”).  
 196.  Id.  
 197.  Jethro Mullen, Hunter Airlifted from Alaskan Island after Bear Attack, CNN 
(Nov. 6, 2014) http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/06/us/alaska-bears-attack-
hunters/. 
 198.  Casey Grove, Be Wary of Moose During Calving Season, Biologists Say, 
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (May 29, 2012), http://www.adn.com/article/2012052 
9/be-wary-moose-during-calving-season-biologists-say.  
 199.  Fatal Wolf Attack Unnerves Alaska Village, NBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35913715/ns/us_news-life/t/fatal-wolf-attack-
unnerves-alaska-village/#.VKMkxGTF-5I. 
 200.  See Hawks, supra note 193. 
 201.  Id.  
 202.  See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200 (h)(1) (2010) (including a shotgun with a 
barrel length of less than 18 inches as a prohibited weapon). 
 203.  Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622–26 (2008).  
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succeed because while sawed-off shotguns might appear to satisfy the 
unique self-defense demands of Alaskans, the weapon would fail the 
second prong. In Alaska, state law makes possession of a sawed-off 
shotgun illegal.204 Indeed, even the repeal of such a law would not save 
sawed-off shotguns from violating the first and third prongs of the 
proposed test. Sawed-off shotguns certainly would not serve a more 
useful self-defense function than the aforementioned smooth-bored 
handgun, failing the first prong, and moreover have an infamous history 
alluded to in Heller that would similarly fail the third prong.205 
Likewise, machine guns, which are banned under the NFA if they 
pre-date 1986206 but are not specifically banned in some states,207 would 
likely still be considered dangerous and unusual under this test. Even in 
states where local laws do not ban automatic weapons, leaving the 
second prong untriggered, the federal ban on machines guns would 
likely survive because a challenge would fail the first and third prongs 
of the aforementioned test. Such a challenge would be unable to 
demonstrate that machine guns are necessary (as opposed to sufficient) 
for self-defense purposes anywhere in the county,208 nor could an 
argument in favor of machine guns refute that automatic weapons have 
historically been used for criminal purposes.209 And while some states, 
 
 204.  See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200 (h)(1) (2010) (including a shotgun with a 
barrel length of less than eighteen inches as a prohibited weapon). 
 205.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 623–24 (describing sawed-off shotguns as 
“weapons which are commonly used by criminals”).  
 206.  26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2012). 
 207.  See State Machine Gun Laws, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://smartgunlaws.org/category/state-machine-guns/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2015) (“Alabama law does not restrict the possession or transfer of machine 
guns.”).  
 208.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“[T]he American people have considered the 
handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.”). While particular 
circumstances in one locale may require slightly more stopping power than a 
handgun, as discussed above regarding Alaskans’ need to defend themselves 
against wild animals, the marginal difference in rate of fire between an 
automatic weapon and semi-automatic weapon is not probative, as semi-
automatic weapons can fire nearly a round per second sufficient to satisfy any 
cognizable self-defense need. See Luis Paulo A. Leme, The Council Directive on 
Control of the Acquisition and Possession of Weapons and its Categorization of 
Firearms: A Rational Approach to Public Safety?, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 568, 581 n.79 
(1996) (“Tests have shown that semi-automatic fire from a light infantry rifle can 
approximate the rate of fire of the same weapon fired automatically and is 
substantially more accurate.”).  
 209.  Adam Winker, Franklin Roosevelt: The Father of Gun Control, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (Dec. 19, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/111266/franklin-
roosevelt-father-gun-control (demonstrating that the NFA ban on machine guns 
was a result of the use of automatic weapons by “gangsters”). Since 1934, 
automatic weapons have been legal only within the very strict confines of the 
NFA.  
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like Wyoming, do not ban sawed-off shotguns,210 leaving the second 
prong of the community standards test unmet, it is unlikely that a 
resident of any state other than Alaska could demonstrate the particular 
need for such a weapon in lieu of other weapons,211 and would thus fail 
to satisfy prong one in challenging the NFA.212 Indeed, this approach to 
firearm localism, while potentially expanding the Second Amendment 
rights of Alaskans, would likely lead to a corresponding narrowing of 
the rights of gun owners in urban areas, perhaps even Anchorage.213 
Localism could provide an avenue for more stringent local firearms 
regulations surviving strict scrutiny in urban areas, where, for example, 
possession of assault-style weapons would be less effectively 
rationalized as related to sporting and hunting. 
A community standards prong would help to clarify Second 
Amendment doctrine post-Heller and would be a logical extension of the 
First Amendment test for obscenity that has clear normative parallels to 
Second Amendment uncommon weapon jurisprudence. Applying this 
test, on an as-applied basis, to federal gun laws as they affect various 
localities might lead to the finding that federal law, in particular the 
NFA ban on “any other weapon” under Title 26 U.S.C. § 5845, may 
violate Alaskans’ Second Amendment rights. Thus, adopting a 
community standards test to challenge the NFA might serve as a more 
fruitful mechanism for Alaskans to challenge federal firearms laws than 
will the Alaska Firearms Freedom Act. 
 
 210.  See Balloun, supra note 78, at 204 n.24 (describing the differences 
between the NFA and Wyoming gun laws, including the omission of short 
barrel shotguns from the latter). 
 211.  For example, Alaska contains ninety-eight percent of the United States 
population of grizzly bears, making the need for a weapon to protect oneself 
from grizzly bears particular to Alaska. Brown Bear, THE ALASKA ZOO, available at 
http://www.alaskazoo.org/brown-bear (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). While this 
Note does not purport to analyze all potential local dangers for a Wyoming 
resident that might create a need to possess a sawed-off shotgun, the historical 
connotation of those weapons as used by criminals, under the test’s third prong, 
would likely defeat any challenge to the ban on sawed-off shotguns. See Heller, 
554 U.S. at 623–24 (describing sawed-off shotguns as “weapons which are 
commonly used by criminals”). 
 212.  Challenges to the ban on sawed-off shotguns would also likely fail for 
the same reasons as challenges to the ban on automatic weapons. See ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.61.200(h)(1) (2010). 
 213.  See Blocher, supra note 19, at 135 (“Focusing energy on urban areas, 
where the costs of gun violence and support for gun control are highest, might 
give gun control advocates a shot at incremental policy victories that have 
proven elusive at the state and national levels.”).  
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CONCLUSION 
The Alaska Firearms Freedom Act (AFFA) is currently in a state of 
legal limbo. While untested in the courts, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Montana v. Holder not only dealt a major blow to federal gun control 
nullification statutes nationwide, but also put Alaska’s law in particular 
jeopardy because Alaska, like Montana, is under the jurisdiction of the 
Ninth Circuit. While the findings section of the legislation raises 
multiple constitutional arguments that would likely be raised in defense 
of the AFFA, the idea that intrastate commerce is outside the purview of 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause has been rejected by the 
Supreme Court, and now, after Montana v. Holder, specifically 
denounced by the Ninth Circuit in the context of a gun control 
nullification bill. Tenth Amendment states’ sovereignty arguments have 
been dealt the same fate. Thus, it is unlikely that any attempt at 
defending the AFFA in federal court would succeed. 
However, Alaskans who believe the federal government is 
infringing on their Second Amendment rights are not without recourse. 
Indeed, because the Supreme Court’s watermark decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller announced a Second Amendment fundamental right 
to use a handgun for self-defense, Alaskans may be able to assert their 
right to smooth bore pistols, capable of firing shotgun shells, via the 
notion that the Second Amendment is necessarily local in character.  
Applying this argument through an analogy to First Amendment 
obscenity doctrine and the consideration of community standards, this 
Note has created a test for whether a weapon has the commonality and 
purpose necessary to warrant Second Amendment protection. This test 
would be a useful clarification of currently ambiguous Supreme Court 
precedent. 
Given the unique self-defense needs of rural Alaska, it is possible 
that a gun that might be uncommon and serve little self-defense purpose 
in some other state would be of substantial utility in Alaska. This 
inquiry would call into question the National Firearms Act, as it relates 
to Alaskan citizens, as that law may effectively preclude Alaskans from 
exercising their fundamental right to self-defense under the Second 
Amendment. At the same time, applying this approach would ensure 
that particularly dangerous weapons are effectively regulated in areas 
where they will do the most harm, like urban environments. So while 
the AFFA is likely invalid after Montana v. Holder, firearm localism, and 
doctoral analogy to obscenity doctrine and the application of 
community standards to Second Amendment scrutiny, may provide a 
balanced approach to examining gun regulations and may even call into 
question existing federal laws as they relate to Alaskans. 
